Human Identity, Animal Identity, and Reflective Endorsement by Robison-Greene, Rachel D
1
Between the SpecieS
Volume 24, Issue 1
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Summer 2021





In this paper, I will argue that philosophers have overestimated the 
value of reflective endorsement. Introspection does not, as many phi-
losophers have supposed, shine a searchlight on a person’s authentic 
identity. Our “selves” are not as transparent to us as we would like to 
think. I will argue that if this is the case, the outputs of the reflective 
endorsement process are not inherently normative in the way that 
thinkers like Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard have suggest-
ed. If this is the case, then the identities that we establish through the 
process of reflective endorsement are not the moral features of our 
experience that we might have supposed. And if this is the case, then 
we would be wrong to place other-than-human animals in a different 
moral category than humans simply because they do not regularly 
engage in reflective endorsement. I will argue that we learn more 
about our authentic selves by monitoring our consistent, reliable dis-
positions to behave. If this is the case, there would no longer be any 
justification for denying that other-than-human animals have coher-
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In Plato’s dialogues, much is made of the Delphic maxim 
“Know Thyself.”  In contemporary individualist cultures, 
knowing oneself has become a significant profit industry.  A 
person who wants to know more about why they behave in the 
way that they do might pay for psychotherapy. A quick library 
database search reveals a seemingly endless list of self-help 
books that claim to help the potential reader to “discover” or to 
“rediscover” herself.
Indeed, for many, knowledge of the self seems to be an im-
portant component for living a meaningful life.   One’s sense of 
self is important for one’s self esteem.  It often involves identi-
fication with a set of values and principles that one finds impor-
tant.  In recent years, a number of philosophical writers have 
cast the self, discovered upon introspection, in critical roles in 
their philosophical theories. For example, Christine Korsgaard 
views the ways in which we identify as the source of the bind-
ing nature of our reasons, both moral and practical (Korsgaard 
1996). Harry Frankfurt attaches our sense of identity to what 
we care about and to what it is to be a person (Frankfurt 2004).
Much discussion of the value of understanding the self puts 
significant emphasis on what a person finds upon introspec-
tion—one identifies with one’s own values through a process 
of reflective endorsement.  There may be some value in this 
internal process. On the other hand, if we identify this way of 
knowing oneself with what it is to be a person, what it is for 
things to be valuable, and what it is that makes a thing a reason 
for a being, it might be easy to conclude that beings that don’t 
have the capacities that humans do for introspection do not live 
valuable, meaningful lives.  
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In this paper, I will argue that, though there is some philo-
sophical value in introspection, it is not as useful as we tend to 
think.  I will argue that we are not as transparent to ourselves as 
we imagine, and that much of what we find upon introspection 
is really just confabulation.  I will contend further that a more 
authentic picture of the self should focus not on what one finds 
upon introspection, but on dispositions to behave.  Though some 
non-human animals may not have the capacity for introspection 
that humans do, they certainly do have behavioral dispositions.
Reflective Endorsement, Human Identity, and 
Human Reasons
As Peter Singer points out in Animal Liberation, philoso-
phers often provide solutions to philosophical problems that at-
tempt to solve those problems as human beings encounter them 
(Singer 1975). The necessary and sufficient conditions for many 
philosophical concepts tend to be drawn up in ways that ren-
der facts about non-human animals and the experiences of such 
animals irrelevant to the conversation.1  Singer points out that 
this description has historically been accurate when it comes 
to philosophical discussion of the problem of inequality.  I con-
tend that we also lack justification for leaving facts about non-
human animals out of the conversation when it comes to many 
other philosophical concepts.  Most relevant to the discussion 
here will be philosophical concepts such as knowledge, reasons 
for action, personhood, and the self.  I’ll provide two examples 
of contemporary philosophical frameworks that encourage us 
(intentionally or not) to think about important philosophical 
questions from a decidedly human lens.
1 I’m thinking, for example, of the distinction between animal and reflec-
tive knowledge in Ernest Sosa’s A Virtue Epistemology. (Sosa 2007)
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Before I do so, however, I want to quickly sketch a fairly 
common picture of the behavior of persons.  Consider the ac-
tivity of Jane.  Throughout her life, Jane forms beliefs on the 
basis of quality evidence.  She is able to do this because she has 
given careful thought to the question of exactly what counts as 
evidence and has made a conscious effort to make sure that her 
beliefs are evidence responsive.  Jane has established a set of 
values.  Those values do much work in defining who she is as 
a person.  When she encounters a moral dilemma, she does her 
best to make sure that her actions are consistent with her val-
ues.  In this way, Jane endeavors to follow the maxim “Know 
Thyself” and to live an examined life.  Notice that through-
out, Jane repeatedly consults her own mental states and takes 
attitudes toward her own thoughts. Let’s keep Jane in mind 
throughout the discussion here.
Turning to contemporary philosophy, let’s look first to the 
work of Christine Korsgaard.  In The Sources of Normativity, 
Korsgaard attempts to answer what she calls The Normative 
Question.  For any normative claim ever made, for any justifi-
cation for action ever offered, it is always possible to ask, “Why 
should I care about that?”   When I make a practical decision, 
The Normative Question arises.  I might decide to spend my 
free time learning a new language so that I can understand 
more about people and the world.  But it’s always possible for 
me to ask myself, “Why should I care about that?”  When I 
make an ethical decision, The Normative Question again aris-
es.  I might decide to donate money to educate women and girls 
in developing nations.  Again, I can always ask myself, “Why 
should I care about that?”   The Normative Question concerns 
the fundamental justification for normativity, both moral and 
practical.  It arises for human beings because we are reflec-
tive creatures—we are creatures capable of asking “why?” On 
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Korsgaard’s view, if we can identify some reply about which 
it would be incoherent to raise this question, we have found a 
satisfactory answer to the Normative Problem.
  It is important to note here that in many ways a search for 
a solution to The Normative Problem is an attempt to avoid 
nihilism or meaninglessness.  If we can’t fundamentally justify 
the things that we care about, maybe they don’t matter after 
all. In the case of morality, we might be left with moral skepti-
cism or even moral nihilism.  We’re looking for a solution that 
somehow justifies our goals and projects.  We’ll see however, 
that the question is posed for rational creatures, and the answer 
offered by Korsgaard is an answer that, if successful, provides 
humans (or other rational creatures) with normatively ground-
ed reasons for action.
Taking an attitude toward one’s own mental states is key to 
answering The Normative Question for Korsgaard.  Specifical-
ly, she focuses on what we’ll call reflective endorsement. Re-
flective endorsement involves (1) introspection, and (2), taking 
an evaluative position toward the inner states upon which one 
introspects.  Endorsement in particular involves affirmation of 
and identification with what one finds upon introspection.
 Korsgaard identifies the correct deliberative procedure for 
action in terms of conforming to what she calls our “practi-
cal identities.”  One’s practical identity is “a description under 
which you value yourself, a description under which you find 
your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth un-
dertaking” (Korsgaard 1996, 101). To act in accordance with a 
practical identity is to reflectively endorse reasons for action 
based upon some specific conception of ourselves.   Most of 
these identities are contingent. For example, a person might 
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conceive of herself as a mother, a daughter, a member of a pro-
fession, or a citizen of a state.  Some identities are more central 
to our lives than others.  The demands these practical identities 
make on us take priority over others that are less fundamental 
to who we are.  All of our practical identities serve to ground 
normative claims.  As Korsgaard argues, “Your reasons for act-
ing express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring 
from what that identity forbids” (Korsgaard 1996, 101).
For Korsgaard, however, we have one practical identity that 
is not contingent, namely, our ‘humanity’.  Humanity is, as she 
defines it, our “identity simply as a human being, a reflective 
animal who needs reasons to act and to live” (Korsgaard 1996, 
121). As she later explains, we are ‘human beings’ insofar as we 
“need to have practical conceptions of [our] identity in order to 
act or to live,” where this most fundamental identity “stands 
behind” all the other particular identities we might have (Kors-
gaard 1996, 129).  Because of its special status, Korsgaard con-
cludes that we must value our own humanity—as well as the 
humanity of everybody else—unconditionally.  This gives rise 
to moral obligations.  It means that I, as a rational creature have 
obligations to you, as another rational creature.  In light of our 
shared status as rational creatures, you have obligations to me 
as well.
Practical Identities and Non-Human Animals
Where does this leave non-human animals?  We are left with 
the conclusion that non-human animals don’t act on the basis of 
reasons, or, at the very least, not on reasons that are genuinely 
normatively binding for them.  If non-human animals aren’t ca-
pable of endorsing identities as, for example, parents or mem-
bers of communities, there is no genuinely normative reason for 
them to act as those roles dictate.  In this way, on Korsgaard’s 
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view, animals seem to be different from human beings, not just 
in degree, but in kind.  Humans are the kinds of things that act 
for reasons and non-human animals are not.
I want to explore the plausibility of the idea that what it is to 
take on a practical identity is to reflectively endorse a certain 
conception of oneself.  Consider the following example.  Mark 
thinks of himself as a writer.  All of his life, he has found the 
aesthetic of being a writer very attractive.  He envisions him-
self someday hiding away in a cabin in the mountains, putting 
the finishing touches on his novel like a character in a Stephen 
King story.  Mark has read books written by successful authors 
providing tips and tricks of the craft.  All the same, Mark hasn’t 
put a word down on paper since college—he never writes any-
thing.  Imagine further that when Mark has free time, he en-
gages in woodworking.  At first, he just poked at it, his wife 
wanted a new shelf for the living room, and he thought they’d 
save money if he made it himself.  As time progressed how-
ever, Mark increasingly spent more and more of his time on the 
weekends in his garage at his workbench.  When Mark reflects 
on himself, when he attempts to know himself, he endorses a 
conception of himself according to which he is a writer.  The 
idea that he is a woodworker never occurs to him.  Which, if 
either of these activities should we think of as one of Mark’s 
“practical identities”?
It may be that “practical identity” is a technical term; by 
stipulation it refers to the conception of oneself that one en-
dorses upon reflection.  If that is the case, it remains to be seen 
whether these ways of conceiving of oneself are valuable. After 
all, what does Mark gain by deluding himself into thinking that 
he is a writer?  What is philosophically interesting about this 
identity constructed out of a misrepresentation of the facts? If, 
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on the other hand, practical identities could be better under-
stood as being revealed by what we do, then perhaps non-hu-
man animals have practical identities after all—identities that 
give them genuinely normative reasons for action.
Non-human animals can and do take on roles in their com-
munities, even if they cannot endorse those roles through a pro-
cess of introspection on their values.  Many animals are very 
social and being social involves standing in certain kinds of 
relations to others and serving certain kinds of functions.  Con-
sider the case of elephants.  Elephants are very social beings 
that live their lives in complex communities.  The matriarchs 
of elephant families are treated as leaders, though whether they 
are followed or not might depend on factors like personality 
and vitality.  Elephants engage in cooperative behavior. Doing 
so requires each elephant to understand their respective role, 
even if they can’t articulate that role or endorse it from a second 
order perspective.  One way of thinking about practical identi-
ties is in terms of the set of things a being reliably and consis-
tently does rather than how that being is inclined to identify.  If 
this is the case, then at least certain animals take on identities 
that correspond to the roles that they play in their communities.
In the case of Mark the would-be writer (or Mark the covert 
woodworker), I’ve described a person who isn’t entirely trans-
parent to himself upon introspection.  Knowing oneself can 
be tricky.  There are other cases of bungled introspection that 
might be greater causes for concern.  These involve instances 
of Sartrean “bad faith.”  Consider the case of Janet.  Over the 
years working her way up the corporate ladder, Janet has be-
come a vicious businesswoman.  She’s quick to take advan-
tage of any opportunity, even if (and, perhaps, especially if) 
doing so would put someone else at a significant disadvantage. 
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When Janet introspects, she sees those tendencies there, they 
are transparent to her.  Nevertheless, such motivations strike 
her as alien impulses.  She does not endorse them, she does 
not view them as arising from her enduring character.  They 
disgust her.  Instead, when she introspects, she endorses a con-
ception of herself according to which she is deeply committed 
to loving her neighbor as herself.  If she ever acts ruthlessly, 
it is not really her, she is succumbing to alien impulses that 
don’t reflect her true character.  And she succumbs all the time. 
Janet is either lying to herself, cherry picking, or both.  In the-
ory, it is possible for every identity that a person endorses upon 
introspection to be formed in bad faith in this way.  It may be 
that these fabricated identities based on wishful thinking about 
one’s true nature provide agents with normatively grounded 
reasons for action.  They have reasons to do what their ideal-
ized picture of themselves would do.  This leaves the motiva-
tion for what they actually do utterly mysterious.
Human beings can weave narratives about their own lives. 
They can tell themselves stories about who they are.  This is an 
interesting fact about human beings.  It has the potential to be 
profoundly beautiful, deeply disturbing, and maybe a little of 
both.  However, this fact about human beings does not entail 
that human beings are different in kind from non-human ani-
mals or that human reasons are fundamentally different from 
the reasons that motivate animals.
I’ve argued that it is possible for people to reflectively en-
dorse conceptions of themselves in ways that either involve 
self-deception or failing to see oneself clearly.  So far, I have 
only demonstrated that this is possible, I haven’t established 
that it is likely.  In the final section of this paper, I’ll provide 
some reasons for thinking that human beings frequently en-
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dorse conceptions of themselves in ways that are less than ideal 
from a philosophical standpoint.  Before I do that, however, I 
want to discuss a related view offered by Harry Frankfurt.
Frankfurt on Human Caring and Love
Harry Frankfurt uses the concept of reflective endorsement 
in his account of what it is to be a person and his account of 
personhood is directly related to his compatibilist view of free 
will.  He notes that human beings are capable of having both 
first and second order beliefs and desires.  For example, a be-
ing may have a first order desire to smoke a cigarette.  In many 
cases, a being’s second order desire may not ever be opera-
tive—that being might, on most occasions, smoke a cigarette 
because they have a first order desire to smoke the cigarette. 
On other occasions, however, a being might have second order 
beliefs and desires about their first order desires.  For example, 
a being could have the following meta belief-desire pair, “I am 
perfectly comfortable with my desire to smoke a cigarette, and 
I want that desire to continue to be operative.”  In this case, 
the being will continue to smoke the cigarette.  A being may 
also have a second order belief-desire pair that conflicts with 
the first order desire.  For instance, the being might have the 
second order belief-desire pair that can be expressed as a belief 
that smoking is dangerous paired with a desire to stop smok-
ing.  In those cases in which the first order desire overwhelms 
the second order desire (in this case, when the being smokes 
the cigarette even when they don’t want to), the being exhibits 
weakness of will.  When the second order desire (sometimes in 
this case referred to as a second order volition) steers the ship 
and motivates the being to do its bidding, the being involved 
exhibits both free will and personhood.  The ability to guide 
one’s first order desires through the use of one’s second order 
desires is what makes a being a free person.  
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The formulation of second order volitions requires intro-
spection.  In order to act, we must take our goals and projects 
seriously.  We must take ourselves seriously.  Frankfurt says, 
Taking ourselves seriously means that we are not pre-
pared to accept ourselves just as we come.  We want our 
thoughts, our feelings, our choices, and our behavior to 
make sense.  We are not satisfied to think that our ideas 
are formed haphazardly, or that our actions are driven 
by transient and opaque impulses or by mindless deci-
sions.  We need to direct ourselves—or at any rate to 
believe that we are directing ourselves—in thoughtful 
conformity to stable and appropriate norms.  We want 
to get things right  (Frankfurt 2006).
To determine whether we are getting things right will in-
volve identification with our own beliefs and desires.  When 
we consider whether we ought to perform an action, we have 
to test the commitments that action entails against other things 
that we care about.  This involves taking an evaluative stance 
toward our attitudes. In making this point, Frankfurt identifies 
what he takes to be a unique quality of members of our species. 
He says, 
We are unique (probably) in being able simultaneously 
to be engaged in whatever is going on in our conscious 
minds, to detach ourselves from it, and to observe it—
as it were—from a distance.  We are then in a position 
to form reflexive or higher order responses to it. For 
instance, we may approve of what we notice ourselves 
feeling, or we may disapprove; we may want to remain 
the sort of person we observe ourselves to be, or we 
may want to be different”  (Frankfurt 2006).
Rachel D. Robinson-Green
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How do we determine what kind of person we want to be? 
It depends on what we care about. Care and love are critical to 
Frankfurt’s position—he takes them to be key to motivation. 
What is it to care?  Frankfurt emphasizes that there is a differ-
ence between merely wanting or desiring a thing and caring 
about that thing. An addict may want a drug, but it does not 
follow that he or she cares about the drug (though, of course, 
some addicts might). Caring about things is a matter of endors-
ing or identifying with them and is a position that we arrive at 
through introspection and reflection.  Caring also has a tempo-
ral component.  He says, “when we do care about something, 
we go beyond wanting it.  We want to go on wanting it, at least 
until the goal has been reached.  Thus, we feel it as a lapse on 
our part if we neglect the desire, and we are disposed to take 
steps to refresh the desire if it should tend to fade” (Frankfurt 
2006).  The caring entails, in other words, an ongoing commit-
ment to the object of care. He says, “By our caring, we main-
tain various thematic continuities in our volitions”  (Frankfurt 
2006).  Though all instances of caring involve second order 
volitions, the converse is not true.  Not all second order vo-
litions represent instances of caring because of the temporal 
component involved in caring.   He says, “Caring about some-
thing implies a diachronic coherence, which integrates itself 
throughout time.”  I’ll call this general requirement Frankfurt’s 
Re-affirmational Requirement for Caring. 
Re-Affirmational Requirement for Caring:  If we care 
about something, we are “disposed [through time] to 
take steps to refresh the desire should it tend to fade.”
Frankfurt also identifies a third category of evaluative at-
titude—there are some things that we come to love.  When we 
love things, we often have very little, or no control at all, over 
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whether we love them.  The things that we love and that we 
can’t help but to care about are what Frankfurt calls “volitional 
necessities.”  He says, “The objects of our love represent our 
most fundamental commitments and provide us with overrid-
ing reasons for action.  When we love something, we see it as 
having value in itself, and we see the interests of the thing or 
the person that we love as worthy of pursuit for their own sake” 
(Frankfurt 2006, 229).   
Like Korsgaard, Frankfurt identifies the source of our most 
compelling set of obligations as the set of things that we would 
die rather than to give up.  For him, these things are volitional 
necessities.  The things that we love provide us with our most 
compelling reasons for action, followed by the reasons that are 
provided by the things that we care about.  Like Korsgaard, 
then, Frankfurt thinks that what explains the value of the things 
that we care about is the very fact that we value them, where 
valuing is a process that requires introspection.
Love, Care, and Non-Human Animals
Unless we want to deny the available behavioral evidence, 
we ought to believe that non-human animals experience and 
engage in both love and care.  When the mother of a non-human 
animal protects and provides for her young even when doing so 
puts her to great hardship or even risks her life, it appears that 
she does so because she cares about her young.  Indeed, it is 
hard to imagine what evidence to the contrary could even look 
like.  After all, the best evidence we can attain for the conclu-
sion that one human being cares for another is the way they 
treat that other.  There is really nothing left to check.  
If we accept Frankfurt’s view, however, we are again left with 
the conclusion that human love and human care differ from love 
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and care experienced and practiced by non-human animals not 
just in degree but in kind. Human care requires the capacity to 
introspect—to take attitudes toward one’s own thoughts. Since 
at least some non-human animals can’t introspect, love and care 
are totally different kinds of phenomena for them. Given that 
all beings evolved under similar conditions, the idea that these 
very similar behaviors are, at their core, fundamentally differ-
ent strikes me as a claim that is implausible on its face.  Setting 
that concern aside, I’ll raise some objections to Frankfurt’s ac-
count of caring.  Throughout, I will again suggest that caring 
might be better understood as a disposition to behave rather 
than as an introspective activity.
Frankfurt’s re-affirmational account of caring requires a be-
ing to understand itself as persisting through time.  That being 
must care, and they must want to want to go on caring.  This 
leaves many non-human animals out of the caring business, at 
least when it comes to caring of this form.  I’ll argue that this is 
an implausible requirement in the case of human beings as well. 
One reason it is implausible is because it assumes that a person 
is always aware of what they care about.  Consider Jane Austin’s 
Emma.  It is clear to all readers from the very outset of the novel 
that Emma cares for Mr. Knightly.  Emma herself professes her 
intentions to never marry and she seems to be oblivious to her 
own affections.  Nevertheless, all of her actions throughout the 
novel support the idea that she cares for Mr. Knightly and at the 
end of the novel the surprise ending is a surprise only to Emma 
herself!  There are, of course, non-fictional examples of this 
kind of phenomenon.  Children may claim to care little for what 
their parents think of them, yet spend their entire lives seeking 
the approval of those very parents.  They may be genuinely un-
aware that they care or of the extent to which they care.
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Frankfurt’s account also suggests that caring is not caring 
unless it persists through time and is introspectively re-af-
firmed repeatedly. Metaphysically, that requirement seems to 
transform all short-term cares into mere “wants.”   I think this 
is implausible.  Consider the following case.  A set of expecting 
parents eagerly awaits the birth of their first child.  The preg-
nancy goes well, and there is no reason to believe anything is 
amiss.  When the child is delivered, it is clear that something is 
horribly wrong. For seconds, the parents care desperately about 
the health of the child—they care more than anything else in 
the world about the continued life of their baby.  Within mo-
ments, it is clear that the care, at least in that particular form, 
no longer makes sense.  The child is dead.  The parents can’t 
carry forth that particular care into the future, they can’t reflec-
tively re-affirm it.  Yet it seems that the phenomenon of care 
was instantiated in the intensity of that particular emotion in 
that particular moment.  
If the two examples I have provided are effective, they show 
that we ought to be reluctant to accept Frankfurt’s account of 
care.  If Frankfurt has shown anything, he has shown that the 
act of re-affirmational caring through introspection may be suf-
ficient for caring but is not necessary.  If this is the case, hu-
mans and non-human animals often, perhaps even most of the 
time, care in the same ways.  
We recognize care behavior when we see it.  When a teacher 
dedicates long hours to help a struggling student, we recognize 
care, even if the teacher never affirms the attitude or tells us 
how she feels.  When an adult child diligently sees to the needs 
of their aging and infirm parent, we recognize care.  When 
members of animal social groups go out of the way to be there 
for one another, we recognize care.  In Ethics and Animals, Lori 
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Gruen describes a relationship between two elephants, Shirley 
and Jenny, who were held together under tragic confinement 
conditions at a circus (Gruen 2011).  Early in their lives, they 
were separated.  They were reunited in later life at an elephant 
sanctuary, and immediately bonded to one another, demon-
strating strong signs that they remembered one another.  Gruen 
describes the end of Jenny’s life in the following way,
Shirley and Jenny, though separated for twenty years, 
were now inseparable at the sanctuary, even through 
Jenny’s very last days.  Jenny, though much younger 
than Shirley, came to the sanctuary in 1996 in very 
ill health.  Jenny recovered enough to enjoy each day 
of her remaining ten years at the sanctuary, but the 
physical toll of her early life was inescapable.  Dur-
ing the last week of Jenny’s life, in October of 2006, 
Shirley was at her side, helping her to get up when she 
could. When it was clear that Jenny’s life was coming 
to an end, Shirley walked off into the woods and stayed 
there.  She didn’t eat for two days.  Shirley had bonded 
with other elephants, and they helped her heal (Gruen 
2011, 131).
Shirley may not be able to take attitudes toward her own 
mental states.  She does not consciously re-affirm her commit-
ment to Jenny’s well-being to see to it that the care continues 
to thrive.  Nevertheless, one of her identities is friend to Jenny, 
and she demonstrates her care and commitment through her 
reliable dispositions to behave in caring ways.
Reflective Endorsement and “Knowing Oneself”
Earlier I asked you to keep in mind an agent, Jane, who always 
forms beliefs on the basis of the best available evidence, and who 
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consistently introspectively keeps her beliefs and values in align-
ment.  People like Jane do not exist.  Jane is an idealized version 
of a human person.  This matters when we are thinking about the 
differences between human animals and non-human animals. 
For reflective endorsement to play the kind of role in philo-
sophical theories that Korsgaard and Frankfurt have in mind, it 
must be the case that agents engage in the reflective process in 
good faith.  There is something very appealing about Jane.  She 
is living the examined life. We like to imagine that all people 
are or can be like Jane. In what follows I will provide some re-
search in empirical social psychology that suggests that reflec-
tive endorsement has some value, but not the value captured 
by our description of Jane.  We tend to reflect and endorse in 
ways that keep us psychologically healthy, even if those en-
dorsements don’t match the facts.  Reflective endorsement may 
be good for mental health but bad for authenticity.  I’ll provide 
two general types of examples below.
The Self-Serving Bias
Studies support the conclusion that we are motivated to both 
attain and to maintain a positive sense of self.  The process of 
reflective endorsement can help us to develop a positive con-
ception of ourselves that is psychologically healthy.  
It is a truism that most people are average.  After all, that’s 
what it is to be average.  Despite the obvious truth of this de-
scription, however, most people believe of themselves that they 
are above average.  In a paper on the topic, Alicke and Govorun 
highlight the results of a well-documented case of the phenom-
enon:
Data collected in conjunction with the 1976 College 
Board Exams provide one of the earliest, most strik-
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ing, and most frequently cited demonstrations of the 
better-than-average effect.  Of the approximately one 
million students who took the SAT that year, 70% 
placed themselves above the median in leadership abil-
ity, 60% above the median in athletic ability, and 85% 
rated themselves above the median in their ability to 
get along well with others (Alicke and Govorun 2005).
It is obvious that many of the participants were wrong about 
how they compared to the average with respect to each of these 
characteristics.  What this study and many others like it high-
light is that we have a psychological need to think highly of 
our good traits—in many cases, more highly than appraisal of 
our traits honestly deserves.  It seems that we do this, in part, 
because thinking highly of ourselves is an important part of 
psychological health.
Importantly for our purposes here, people also have a ten-
dency to view themselves as better moral agents than their 
peers.  Codol asked study participants to assess how often they 
conformed to socially desirable norms (Codol 1975).  Most par-
ticipants indicated that they conformed to such norms more of-
ten than average.  
As a result of the better-than-average phenomenon, or our 
self-serving bias, we are inclined to view ourselves in more 
favorable ways than might actually be warranted by the best 
available evidence.   Viewing ourselves in the best possible 
light, or, at least, in a better-than average light, contributes to 
psychological health. Reflective endorsement can, and probably 
often does, contribute to this conception of ourselves.  We in-
trospect, we consider ourselves and our traits, and we employ a 
heuristic that emphasizes the positive.
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Self-Verification
 Reflective endorsement can also be psychologically healthy 
in another way—to satisfy a need we have to verify those 
components of the self that we already take ourselves to have. 
Some social scientists have suggested that, in addition to sat-
isfying a need for predictability and control, our impulse to 
self-verify also satisfies a psychological need that we have to 
have “consistent and balanced cognitions” (Moskowitz 2005). 
Too much change is unsettling to us.  Therefore, in addition to 
attempting to maintain a positive view of ourselves, we also try 
to maintain a stable one.  
In support of the claim that human beings have a tendency 
toward self-verification that is distinct from their tendency to-
ward self-serving affirmations, studies have been conducted 
that indicate that human beings prefer to be judged negatively 
with respect to those features of their lives or behavior that they 
already view as being deficient.  In one such study, participants 
were asked to describe their worst feature (e.g., their weight) 
(Jr. 1990). Other participants were then brought in to comment 
on that feature.  Some of these participants said something 
positive about the feature and others said something negative 
about the feature.  The original participants were then asked 
which of the two assessors they would like to participate with 
in a later stage of the experiment, and people chose the asses-
sor who agreed with their assessment of their negative feature 
rather than the one who disagreed with it.  It may be, then, that, 
to achieve a sense of consistency, we accept evidence from 
others that supports the ways in which we already want to view 
ourselves, and that we reject disconfirming evidence.  
The process of reflection on one’s own attributes followed 
by disavowing one or more of them is a paradigm case of en-
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gaging in a reflective endorsement process (or, in this case, an 
instance of reflective disavowal). These studies suggest that we 
like confirmation of the ways in which we are already inclined 
to view ourselves.  
 Reflective endorsement is a useful mechanism for achiev-
ing mental health and stability.  To that extent, it is valuable. 
That said, these examples undercut the idea that endorsement 
is a way of constructing normatively binding reasons for action 
and undermine the idea that introspection reveals to us what 
we really care about.  It seems that one of the main functions 
of reflective endorsement is to prevent us from plunging into 
existential crisis caused by psychologically distressing or dis-
orienting discoveries about ourselves. 
Conclusion
According to many philosophers, the ability to reflect on 
one’s own inner states and to take an evaluative attitude toward 
what one finds is an ability that sets human beings apart from 
non-human animals.  In this paper, I have argued that endorse-
ment does not serve the philosophical functions often attribut-
ed to it.  If this is correct, then species membership may make 
little difference when it comes to motivation, reasons, caring, 
and love.  People reveal who they are and what they care about 
through their reliable behavior.  In this way, we are not dif-
ferent in kind from non-human animals who also demonstrate 
commitment and care through their dispositions to behave in 
caring ways.
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